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A stochastic dynamic programming model is used to compare the farmland investment 
impact of a fully decoupled direct payment and a standard price subsidy.  The direct 
payment induces the farmer to invest because it lowers the farm’s debt to asset ratio, 
which in turn reduces the probability of bankruptcy.  The value of the real option to defer 
the investment decision is lower with a lower risk of bankruptcy, and thus the direct 
payment results in a higher probability of immediate investment.  Simulation results 
demonstrate that for a farm facing moderate revenue and land price variability, the impact 
of a decoupled direct payment on farm investment is nearly as large as the investment 
impact of an equal-sized price subsidy.  These results suggest that direct payments, such 
as those associated with U.S. production flexibility contracts, should be carefully 




This paper is based on a larger research report, which was prepared for the OECD and 
presented at the OECD office in Paris in May, 2003.  Many helpful comments from 
participants of the OECD workshop have been incorporated into this draft.   1 
I. Introduction 
  In recent years, several papers have examined the link between decoupled farm 
subsidies (hereafter referred to as direct payments) and farm output.  Wealth enhancing 
payments that do not depend on farm output or farm size may increase agricultural 
production and investment by freeing up financial resources for a credit-constrained 
farmer, by providing a farmer with better terms of credit and by reducing a farmer’s 
aversion toward engaging in risky production and investment activities (Chavas and Holt; 
Hennessy; Tielu and Roberts; Young and Westcott; Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder; 
OECD 2002; USDA).  A farmer may also increase production in anticipation that future 
direct payments will be based on historic levels of production (OECD 2000).  Benjamin 
shows how labour market imperfections can eliminate the separation between farm 
household consumption and production decisions.  Without separation, direct payments 
can potentially raise farm production.  Vercammen identifies other economic linkages 
between direct payments and farm output including binary labour market decisions by the 
farm household, intergenerational transfer of farm assets, a rising marginal rate of 
taxation on farm income and a wedge between the cost of borrowing and the cost of 
saving. 
  Understanding the link between a direct payment and farm output is important, 
especially from an international trade perspective.  The international community is 
increasingly scrutinizing the potential trade impacts of various types of farm support 
programs.  Direct payments have received little attention in previous World Trade 
Organization (WTO) negotiations, but this has now changed given the recent emergence 
of large-scale direct payment programs such as production flexibility contracts in the   2 
U.S., which are typically reported as “green”.
1  The international community’s initial 
enthusiasm for direct payments will erode if it is discovered that these payments can raise 
farm output substantially through indirect mechanisms. 
  An area that has received comparatively little attention is the dynamic link 
between direct payments and investment in farm assets such as land and machinery.  
These dynamic investment impacts are important from a trade perspective because a 
higher level of farm investment can result in higher levels of farm output for many 
subsequent years.  It is well known that in the absence of market failures, there is no link 
between a direct payment and farm investment because the optimal level of investment 
depends only on the internal rate of return and the market rate of interest, and neither of 
these variables are impacted by a direct payment.  The various types of market failure 
that dynamically link farm investment to a direct payment are similar to those previously 
discussed (e.g., lack of risk sharing and credit constraints).  Credit market constraints are 
particularly important for the case of agricultural investment because agriculture tends to 
be highly capitalized and highly dependent on debt capital. 
  The purpose of this paper is to use a dynamic programming model of farm 
investment and credit market failure to demonstrate that there may exist a strong and 
positive link between a direct payment and farm investment in a typical owner-operator 
farm operation.  The model is quite simple (i.e., most of the usual complexities of farm 
decision making under risk have been stripped away) and only a single credit market 
imperfection is introduced. Consequently, all of the investment impacts that result from 
the direct payment can be attributed to this single market imperfection.  The credit market 
                                                 
1 The USDA acknowledges the theoretical links between a direct payment and farm 
output, but finds that these links are empirically insignificant in a survey of U.S. farmers.   3 
fails because farm lenders are assumed to employ a rules-based approach to farm 
foreclosure (i.e., bankruptcy) decisions.  The lenders’ rule is to declare the farm bankrupt 
and seize the farm’s assets if the farm becomes insolvent (i.e., farm equity erodes to 
zero).  Assuming a rules-based approach is reasonable because of the comparatively high 
degree of asymmetric information within a typical agricultural lending relationship and 
because insolvency is a natural bankruptcy trigger for lenders in more general lending 
situations.
2   
  In this model, the rules-based approach to bankruptcy is a market failure because 
at the point of insolvency, the expected long-run financial viability of the farmer is still 
positive.  This notion of “premature bankruptcy” has previously been examined by 
Vercammen (2000).  Vercammen showed that premature bankruptcy results in a positive 
option value associated with the deferral of the investment decision.  The larger the 
farm’s debt to asset ratio, the larger the associated option value and the greater the 
probability the farmer will defer the investment decision.  In this paper, Vercammen’s 
finding is used to establish a link between a direct payment and farm investment.
3 A 
lower debt to asset ratio, which results from a direct payment, reduces the investment 
option value, which in turn increases the probability that a farmer will make an 
                                                 
2 A comparatively small number of North American farmers actually exit agriculture each 
year because of full-blown bankruptcy.  One reason for this outcome is that various forms 
of mediation and settlement mechanisms have been imposed on (or are made available 
to) the agricultural community.  Nevertheless, as long as the farmer suffers some level of 
financial distress when the business becomes insolvent, the qualitative nature of the 
results presented here will remain intact. 
3 Unlike Vercammen (2000), option values are not explicitly isolated and examined in 
this paper.  Only part of the incentive to forego an investment with a positive rate of 
return is due to the option value.  Even in a single-period model with no dynamic 
connections and thus with no option value, a risk-neutral farmer who faces the risk of 
premature bankruptcy may choose to not make a seemingly profitable investment.   4 
immediate investment.  These indirect investment impacts are shown to be surprisingly 
strong. 
The results of this research are consistent with the findings of several related 
studies.  Using a static framwork, Mahul shows that a farmer who faces an external 
liquidation cost when debt servicing obligations cannot be met, will forego making some 
risky investments that have a positive short-run rate of return.  In a more general setting, 
Holt and Milne and Robertson use stochastic continuous time optimal control to 
theoretically examine the dividend and investment decisions of a firm that faces 
liquidation if cash balances fall to zero.  The solution to this type of problem involves 
“barrier control”.  Specifically, no investment takes place if the firm’s cash balance is 
below a threshold level that depends on the current stock of capital.  If the cash balance 
rises above this threshold, then investment is increased until the cash balance falls to 
exactly the threshold level.  Certainly a direct payment would increase the expected level 
of investment in these types of barrier control models. 
The dynamic programming model used for this analysis can be described as 
follows.  A risk-neutral farmer chooses whether or not to invest in a single unit of 
homogenous land for each of T periods (the investment decision is fully irreversible).
4  
The farmer’s objective is to maximize the expected net worth of the farm as of date T.  
Farm debt is random over time because farm revenues are random.  The value of the farm 
is also random over time because the random price of farmland is positively correlated 
                                                 
4 The model is described in terms of investment in land, but the results are applicable to a 
wide range of agricultural investments including machinery, buildings, livestock 
inventory and various production technologies.  The extent that investment in agricultural 
land raises farm output at a macro level depends on how the land was being utilized prior 
to the investment.   5 
with farm revenues.  If farm debt rises to the level of farm value at any point prior to date 
T, then farm bankruptcy occurs and the farmer receives zero net worth at date T.  
Expected cumulative investment as of date 0 is compared for three separate scenarios: (1) 
no subsidy; (2) a standard price subsidy for each of the T periods; and (3) a direct 
payment each period with present value equal to the expected present value of the price 
subsidy. 
In addition to the assumptions detailed above (i.e., risk neutrality, irreversible 
investment and exogenous consumption), supply response and investment adjustment 
costs are assumed away.  The farm operates with constant returns to scale such that each 
unit of homogenous land receives the same revenue in a given period, and this revenue is 
drawn from a distribution that is independent of farm size.  Because there is no supply 
response, the price subsidy (recall scenario 2 above) is really an area payment, whereby 
each unit of land receives a fixed payment regardless of the level of production.  In a 
more general model, the price of farmland will react to changes in the demand for 
farmland and will therefore be endogenous.  This level of complexity has been assumed 
away by making the price of farmland an exogenous stochastic process.  The price of 
farmland is assumed positively correlated with revenues and the subsidy payment is 
assumed subject to different exogenous rates of capitalization, so there is at least some 
linkage between the price of farmland and the demand for farmland.  Although the above 
assumptions limit the generality of the results, the fact that farm investment is strongly 
linked to a direct payment in a simple model suggests that this linkage is not likely to 
readily break down as the various assumptions are relaxed.    6 
The stochastic dynamic programming investment model is constructed and 
discussed in the next section.  Values for the parameters of the simulation model are 
selected in Section III.  The simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV.  
Conclusions and a discussion about the direction for future research are contained in 
Section V. 
 
II. Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model 
 
  Beginning at date 0 a risk-neutral farmer chooses whether or not to invest in a unit 
of homogenous farmland for each of T periods in order to maximize the farm’s expected 
net worth at date T.  Off-farm employment income, capital and non-capital farm expense, 
personal consumption expense and savings external to the farm are the same for each unit 
of land and are implicitly netted out of farm revenue.  Residual farm revenue (positive or 
negative), which is random over time, is fully used to pay down farm debt (negative debt 
implies savings).  The outstanding principle component of farm debt falls or rises each 
period, depending on whether residual farm income is greater than or less than the 
interest owing on current outstanding farm debt.  Net worth is equal to the market value 
of the farmland minus the outstanding principle component of farm debt. 
  The farmer’s cost of borrowing (i.e., the rate of interest) is assumed constant over 
time.  There is no risk premium built into the interest rate because the lender can instantly 
and costlessly seize and sell the farmer’s land if the level of farm debt rises above the 
value of the land.
5 If the lender does seize the farm’s assets prior to time T, the farm’s net 
                                                 
5 This assumption is valid in a continuous time model but is somewhat less suitable for 
the current discrete time model. With discrete time, farm debt might strictly exceed the 
value of the farmland if the lender chooses to wait until the farmer is deemed insolvent 
before seizing and reselling the assets.   7 
worth equals zero at time T.   As discussed above, this solvency-based foreclosure rule 
impacts the farmer’s investment decision because, from the perspective of the farmer, 
foreclosure at the point of insolvency is generally premature.
6 Parameter values are 
assumed to be such that in the absence of premature foreclosure (or in the absence of risk 
in general), the farmer would choose to invest during each of the T periods.  It is 
therefore only the risk of premature foreclosure that causes expected cumulative 
investment to drop below the maximum of T units. 
  The farmer faces two sources of risk that jointly determine the probability of 
bankruptcy: variable farm returns and a variable price of farmland.  The former affects 
the temporal variation in debt and the latter affects the temporal variation in the 
bankruptcy trigger.  An ideal specification of the model would have farm returns and the 
price of farmland cointegrated over time in a standard time series framework.  There is a 
large literature which supports the notion that farm returns and the price of farmland are 
positively correlated over time, but not to the extent that the classic present value 
relationship between these two series can be statistically detected (e.g., Featherstone and 
Baker; Falk; Clark, Fulton and Scott; Falk and Lee).  Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
solve the dynamic programming model if farm returns and the price of farmland are 
assumed cointegrated without restrictions.  As an alternative, assume net farm revenues 
are repeatedly drawn from a stationary distribution, and the price of farmland evolves 
over time as a mean reverting stochastic process with the random component of this 
                                                 
6 Mean revenues are denoted R .  Farm equity is expected to grow as long as R  > rdt 
where dt denotes outstanding debt at time t per unit of land and r is the rate of interest.  
The long run price of land, P , is equal to (R  -  δ )/r where δ  is a measure of farm 
profitability.  After substituting it can be seen that farm equity is expected to grow as 
long as dt < P + δ /r.  If the current price of land, Pt, is less than P  + δ /r, then the dt = Pt 
foreclosure rule is premature because when dt = Pt, farm equity is expected to grow.   8 
process positively correlated with revenues.  The long-run expected price of farmland is 
set equal to the capitalized value of mean farm returns after allowing for a predetermined 
profit margin.   




t P t t Z P P P σ θ θ + − + = + ) 1 ( 1  
where 
P
t Z is a standard normal random variable generated at the end of the period, σ P is a 
parameter that governs the variability of the unanticipated change in the price of 
farmland, P is the long-term expected price of farmland and θ  ∈  [0, 1] is a mean 
reversion weighting parameter.
7 The initial price of farmland is restricted equal to the 
long-term expected price by assuming P0 = P . 
In the absence of any investment in period t, the equation of motion for debt, Dt, 
measured at the beginning of the period, can be written as 
(2)  w n s R D r D t t t
no
t − + − + = + )
~
( ) 1 ( 1  
where r is the fixed rate of interest on outstanding debt,  t R
~
is net revenues, which are 
drawn at the end of period t from a normal distribution with mean R and standard 
deviation σ R, nt is the number of units of land owned by the farmer at the beginning of 
period t, s is the area payment per unit of land and w is the whole farm direct payment.   
Both s and w are constant from period to period.  The correlation coefficient between
P
t Z  
from equation (1) and  t R
~
 from equation (2) is denoted ρ  ∈  (0, 1).   
                                                 
7 If this model is viewed as an approximation of a continuous time model within which 
variables such as the price of land evolve over time as Brownian motion, then assuming 
that the price of land is normally distributed is not unreasonable.   9 
If the farmer chooses to invest at the beginning of period t, then equation (2) 
becomes 
(3)  w n s R P D r D t t t t
yes
t − + + − + + = + ) 1 )(
~
( ) )( 1 ( 1 . 
Because it is useful to work with debt per unit of land (denoted dt), rewrite equations (2) 
and (3) as 
(4)  t t t
no
t n w s R d r d / )
~





























  The problem facing the farmer as of date 0 is to choose whether or not to invest in 
a unit of farmland for each of the subsequent T periods in order to maximize the expected 
value of terminal net worth, W(T), where W(T) = n(T)[P(T) – d(T)] if d(t) < P(t) for t ∈  
{1, 2, ..., T} and W(T) = 0 otherwise.  Assuming D0 < P0, the state equations describing 
the evolution of P(t) and d(t) are given by equations (1), (4) and (5).  This specification of 
the problem requires discrete stochastic dynamic programming with numerical 
procedures to solve.  The single control variable is the T period binary investment 
decision and the three state equations correspond to the price of land, unit debt and farm 
size. 
 
Probability Transition Matrices 
 
The next task is to construct a pair of probability transition matrices: one matrix 
corresponds to the case of no investment and the other matrix corresponds to the 
investment case.  Let P
min and P
max denote the minimum and maximum price of farmland.  
Let h
p denote the number of discrete intervals between P
Min and P
Max.  Let P
0 = P
min, P
i =   10 
P
min + (i – 0.5)(P
max – P
min)/h
p for i∈ {1, …, h
p} and 
max 1 P P
p h =
+ .  For i∈ {1, …, h
p}, 
price interval i now refers to the price interval that is centered on P




p.  Price interval 0 refers to the P
min reflecting barrier and price interval
1 +
p h P refers 
to the P
max reflecting barrier.  Intervals for debt are defined analogously.   
It is necessary to calculate PR
i,j,k,l,n where PR denotes probability, i is the index of 
the prevailing land price and j is the index of the prevailing unit debt at the beginning of 
the period, k refers to the land price interval and l refers to the unit debt interval at the 
end of the period, and n refers to the number of units of land in excess of n0 held at the 
beginning of the period.  The number of new units of land at the end of the period is 
equal to n if no investment takes place and n + 1 if investment does take place.  PR
i,j,k,l,n 
measures the probability that a farm with n units of land and with price centered in 
interval i and unit debt centered in interval j will finish the period with price in interval k 
and unit debt in interval l.  This probability calculation must be made for the two 
alternative cases of with and without investment.  The number of individual probability 
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, is given by equation (6) with 
l
lower d substituted for 
l
upper d .
8  The 
subscripts “lower” and “upper” on the d
l variable indicates that the variable takes on a 
value equal to the respective endpoint of the d
l debt interval.  It is easily shown using 
equations (4) through (6) that if land price is centered in interval i and unit debt is 
centered in interval j at the beginning of the period, then the probability that end-of-
period debt will lie in interval l is equal to probability that the standardized normal 
random variable
R





, , ,.  
  To calculate this latter probability, it is necessary to recognize that 
P
t Z from 
equation (1) and 
R
t Z  are jointly normally distributed.  It is therefore necessary to identify 
the analogous interval for 
P
t Z such that a joint probability can be determined.  Using 





















The probability that land price will fall in interval k and unit debt will fall in interval l 
given that price and unit debt at the beginning of the period are centered in intervals i and 
j, respectively, can now be expressed as 
(8) 



















, , , , ρ ∫ ∫ =  
where f(
. , 
. ; ρ) is the probability density function for the standard bivariate normal 
distribution with correlation coefficient, ρ.  For all possible values of n, equation (8) can 
be used to calculate the elements of the without-investment and with-investment 
                                                 
8 To deal with the reflecting barriers, set  −∞ =
0
lower d , 
min 0 d dupper = , 







upper d .  Make analogous adjustments for the Z
P variables in equation (7).   12 
probability transition matrices.  The procedure for numerically evaluating equation (8) is 
reported in the Appendix. 
 
Recursive Solution Procedure 
  Let Vt
n denote a matrix with dimension (h
P + 2, h
d + 2).  The i
th row of this matrix 
corresponds to price interval i and the j
th column corresponds to debt interval j.  Element 
(i, j) of matrix Vt
n is a present value measure of expected date T net worth as of the 
beginning of period t given farm size n, assuming that land price is centered in price 
interval i and unit debt is centered in debt interval j.  Element (i, j) of matrix 
n
T V  is equal 
to (PT- dT)nT if PT > dT and zero otherwise.  Element (i, j) of 
n
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The subscripts “no” and “yes” on the probability transition matrices within equation (9) 
identify whether the particular matrix has been derived with or without investment.  The 
bottom component of equation (9) corresponds to farm bankruptcy.  Equation (9) shows 
how recursion can be used to calculate 
n
T V 2 − , 
n
T V 3 −  and so forth until period 0 is reached.   
  The dynamic programming problem can now be solved by determining the states 
and time periods for which investment takes place.  Let 
n
t I denote a matrix with the same 
dimension as 
n
t V .  Element (i, j) of this matrix takes on a value of 0 (no investment case) 
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Equations (9) and (10) can be jointly used to solve the entire problem recursively, starting 
with time T – 1 and finishing with time 0. 
  The variable of particular interest is expected cumulative investment from date 0 
to date T as of date 0.  Let 
n
t CI  be identical to 
n
t I  except the former denotes expected 
cumulative investment from time t to time T rather than current investment.  The 
recursive formula for calculating element (i, j) of matrix 
n
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To utilize equation (11), note that 
n
T CI (i, j) = 0 for all combinations of i and j.   
The total reduction in expected cumulative investment as of date 0 is given by T - 
n CI0 (i, j) because T is equal to maximum feasible cumulative investment.  It is useful to 
decompose this total reduction into two components: forced reduction due to bankruptcy 
and voluntary reduction due to implicit risk aversion.  The forced reduction component is 
equal to T less the expected number of periods the farm expects to survive.  This latter 
variable can be calculated by redefining the variables in equation (11) and adding a “1” to 
the top formula.  The difference between the forced and total reduction in expected 
cumulative investment is equal to the voluntary component of reduced investment.  This   14 
latter variable is of particular interest in this analysis, especially in the context of how it is 
impacted by the two types of subsidy schemes. 
 
III. Simulation Model Calibration 
  The main purpose of this analysis is to determine how the investment impact of an 
area payment subsidy compares with the investment impact of an equivalent size direct 
payment subsidy.  Equivalent size implies equal expected net present value of the subsidy 
as of date 0, assuming a constant rate of subsidization over time.  To calculate the 
expected present value of the area payment, use equation (11) with the following 
modifications: substitute (n0 + nt)s  for the two expressions in period T, add (n0 + nt)s to 
the first line and replace the “1” with (n0 + nt + 1)s in the second line when t < T and 
finally divide the double summation term by 1 + r to ensure discounting.  Let PVarea(j) 
denote the expected present value of the area payment as of date 0 given that the date 0 
price of land is P and date 0 unit debt is centered in interval j.   
  The direct payment, w, is paid to the farmer regardless of farm size.  If  
(12)  ()
1
) 1 ( 1
1
) (












j PV w , 
then a farmer with initial debt centered in interval j will expect to receive the same 
cumulative payment with the two different subsidy schemes.  It is too complicated to 
compute equivalent direct payment values for all different values of j.  Instead, an 
equivalent direct payment is calculated for the specific case of j
*. Investment impacts can 
therefore be meaningfully compared only for j = j
*.  
  Rather than attempting to calibrate the model to a particular real-world scenario, 
artificial (but realistic) parameter values will be utilized.  The aim is to choose a simple   15 
set of parameter values for the base case and to then conduct sensitivity analysis to check 
the robustness of the results.  Parameter selection for the base case begins by assuming a 
twenty year time horizon with a two year decision period (i.e., T = 10).  Computer time 
required to solve the problem and the approximation error due to the discrete nature of 
the program place an upper limit on the chosen value of T.  With a 24 month decision 
period, it is reasonable to set r = 0.1 (i.e., a 10 percent rate of interest).  
  With r = 0.1, the land price capitalization formula equals 1/0.1 = 10.  Given this 
result, it is useful to normalize the model by setting average farm revenue, R , equal to 1 
and the long-run expected price of land, P , equal to 10.  However, with R  = 1 and P  = 
10, the farmer would only just expect to break even on all land purchases.  Through trial 
and error it was discovered that a 5 percent excess return provides a reasonably strong 
(but not overwhelmingly strong) incentive to purchase land for farmers with a moderate 
level of initial debt.  Thus, R  = 1.05 and P  = 10 for the base case. 
  Now consider values for θ , P
min, P
max and σ P.  Recall that θ  controls the rate of 
mean reversion in the state equation for the price of land.  With θ  = 0, land price is a 
random walk (i.e., there is no mean reversion).  With θ  = 1, the price of land is equal to 
P plus a random error term (i.e., both the short run and long run expected price do not 
change over time).  The farmer faces a comparatively high risk of premature bankruptcy 
in the first case and a comparatively low risk in the second case.  For the base case, an 
intermediate position was taken by setting θ  = 0.5.  The remaining three parameters, P
min, 
P
max and σ P, were chosen simultaneously to achieve moderate land price variability.  
With P = 10, P
min = 6, P
max = 14 and σ P = 1, moderate price risk is achieved and the   16 
probability that at least one of the reflecting barriers is reached over a 10 period horizon 
with a starting price of 10 is less than percent.    
  It is also necessary to choose appropriate values for d
min and d
max.  Because 
bankruptcy occurs when dt ≥  Pt, it is reasonable to set d
max = 15 ≈  P
max.   Setting d
min 
involves a tradeoff.  On the one hand, setting a large difference between d
max and d
min 
minimizes the probability that debt will hit the d
min reflecting barrier (in which case the 
results will be biased).  However, a large difference corresponds to relatively wide debt 
intervals for the probability transition matrix, and the size of the approximation error is 
positively related to the size of the interval.  Through trial and error it was discovered that 
setting d
min = -15 results in a reasonable balance between minimizing the degree of bias 
due to a binding lower reflecting barrier for debt and minimizing the approximation error 
due to an excessively large debt interval. 
  The variability in unit debt depends primarily on σ R, which is the standard 
deviation of the normal distribution from which farm revenues are drawn.  Because R  = 
1.05 in the base case, the chosen value of σ R approximately represents the coefficient of 
variation of farm revenues.  In order to compensate for the restrictive assumption that 
farm revenues are stationary over time (which limits the level of temporal variation in 
farm debt) σR was set at a relatively high level (0.75).  The other important determinant 
of risk is the correlation coefficient between farm revenues and the price of land.  
Although the price of land should not theoretically change with revenue because the 
distribution from which revenue is drawn from each period is stationary, in reality it is 
common for farm returns and the price of land to be positively correlated over time.  To 
capture this notion of risk, it was decided that setting ρ  = 0.5 was reasonable.   17 
  Increasing the number of price and debt intervals in the probability transition 
matrices increases the accuracy of the model, but also rapidly increases the amount of 
computing time needed to solve the model. Having a larger number of intervals is more 
important for debt than for land price because debt is an endogenous variable with no 
natural reflecting barriers, whereas land price is exogenous with reflecting barriers that 
can be specified prior to solving the model.  Through trial and error, it was discovered 
that a model with 3 intervals for price and 30 intervals for debt solves in about one hour 
on a standard home computer and results in a reasonably “stable” and “smooth” solution.
9 
For the remaining variables, it was decided that n0 = 5 and j
* = 21 such that the 
farmer begins with 5 units of land and the analysis focuses on a farmer with an initial 
debt to asset ratio of 45 percent.
10   These values are reasonable for a farmer in his/her 
early years of expansion.  The area payment parameter, s, was set to 0.2 for the base case 
and for all the different sensitivity scenarios.  With R  = 1.07, setting s = 0.2 implies a 
subsidy rate of about 20 percent.  The value of w that ensures an equivalent size direct 
payment is different for each different set of parameters because the expected cost of the 
area payment depends on the expected level of investment.  
   For the base case, it is assumed there is no capitalization of the subsidy into the 
price of land.   That is, values for P , P
min and P
max do not change when either the area 
payment or direct payment is provided to the farmer.  With r = 0.1 and s = 0.2, the three 
price variables will increase by 0.2/0.1 = 2 under the assumption of full capitalization. 
                                                 
9 With these values and with T = 10, each of the two probability transition matrices 
contain 32*32*5*5*10 = 256,000 cells.  The program was written and solved using 
version 6.1 of Matlab.  The code for running this program is available upon request. 
10 Unit debt intervals are of size 1 and d
min = d
1 = -15, so the 20
th debt interval ranges 
from 4.0 to 5.0.  With P0 = P = 10, the midpoint of the 20
th interval corresponds to a debt 
to asset ratio of 45 percent.   18 
The full capitalization case is not very interesting to consider because in this case the 
additional incentive for the farmer to invest after receiving the subsidy is very small.  In 
the sensitivity analysis, results are presented for the case of 50 percent capitalization of 
the area payment and both 50 and 25 percent capitalization of the direct payment.
11  
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for the base case and for the four sensitivity 
analysis scenarios.  Notice that in addition to examining how the results are impacted the 
capitalization assumption, sensitivity is also determined for revenue variability, the 
correlation between farm revenues and land price, and the length of the time horizon.    
 
IV.  Simulation Results 
 
  Figure 1 is a graph of the results for the base case.  On the horizontal axis is 
different levels of the farm’s debt to asset ratio at date 0.  Ratios in excess of 0.75 are not 
considered because the bias in the results becomes significant at high levels of debt.
12 
The results are plotted as if the initial debt to asset ratio is a continuous variable (this 
ratio actually increases in discrete jumps of size one).   
 
                                                 
11 The capitalization rate for the direct payment should be such that the difference in the 
level of capitalization for the two types of subsidy schemes is equal to the difference in 
the increase in demand for land that results from the two types of subsidy schemes.  This 
level of complexity is ignored in this analysis by assuming that the rate of capitalization 
for the direct payment is equal to either 100 percent or 50 percent of the rate of 
capitalization of the direct payment. 
12 Recalling the discussion in note #5, r should contain a risk premium that grows with the 
farm’s level of debt.  Assuming away this risk premium biases upward the farmer’s 
incentive to invest, especially at high levels of debt.    19 
 The vertical axis is a measure of expected cumulative investment (measured in units of 
land) and expected survival of the farm (measured in years).
13 There are two lines in 
Figure 1 for the case of no subsidy.  The solid line reflects the total reduction in 
investment that results from premature foreclosure and the dashed line reflects the forced 
reduction in investment that is due to bankruptcy.  The vertical difference between the 
solid and dashed no-subsidy lines, which is quite large for this base case, is a measure of 
the voluntary reduction in investment due to the farmer’s implicit aversion toward 
premature foreclosure. 
  The other two lines in Figure 1 correspond to expected cumulative investment 
with a 20 percent area payment and with a calibrated direct payment.  The two subsidy 
schemes have equal expected present value when the initial debt to equity ratio is equal to 
0.45 (i.e., the location of the vertical dotted line).
14 The vertical difference between each 
of these lines and the solid no-subsidy line is a measure of the extent that the respective 
subsidy has raised investment.  Notice that with an initial debt to equity ratio of 0.45, the 
area subsidy has raised cumulative investment from about 6.2 to 8.4 whereas the direct 
payment has raised investment from about 6.2 to 8.  The ratio of these differences is 
equal to (8.0 – 6.2)/(8.4 – 6.2) = 0.818.  In other words, the increase in investment 
stemming from the direct payment is about 82 percent as large as the increase in 
investment stemming from the area payment.   At lower levels of debt, the difference in 
the investment impact for the two types of subsidies is smaller, despite the fact that the 
                                                 
13 Land units and years can be plotted on the same axis because the farmer is restricted to 
purchasing either no land or one unit of land per year. 
14 The value of the direct payment is smaller than the value of the area payment to the left 
of the vertical dotted line because investment (and thus the expected size of the area 
payment) is comparatively large at low levels of debt.  The opposite is true to the right of 
the vertical dotted line.   20 
expected value of the direct payment is less than the expected value of the area payment 
(see note 14).  
The reason for these rather strong results is not immediately obvious because 
there are several interdependent forces at work.  First, the area payment raises the direct 
marginal incentive to invest when Pt <  r R /  whereas there is no direct marginal incentive 
effect attached to the direct payment.  Second, both types of subsidies lower the farm’s 
debt to asset ratio, which in turn lowers the probability of future bankruptcy.  A lower 
probability of bankruptcy implies a lower option value associated with a deferral of the 
investment decision and thus a higher probability of immediate investment.  It is 
uncertain if the two types of subsidies have a differential impact on this option value 
effect.  Third, as in the standard Dixit and Pindyck model of investment with uncertainty 
and irreversibility, the farmer may also have an incentive to defer the investment decision 
because of randomness in the price of land.  The extent to which this option value is 
impacted differently by the two types of subsidies is unknown. 
Figures 2 through 5 illustrate the results for the four alternative sensitivity 
scenarios.  In Figure 2, the issue of subsidy capitalization is considered.  As is expected, 
50 percent capitalization of the area payment implies an overall lower level of cumulative 
investment when the area payment is provided to a farmer (i.e., the vertical difference 
between the two dark shaded schedules is less than in the base case).  Figure 2 shows that 
the investment impact of a 50 percent capitalized direct payment is quite small.  Given 
this result, it might be more reasonable to assume a 25 percent capitalization rate for the 
direct payment when the capitalization rate for the area payment is 50 percent.  In this 
case (also illustrated in Figure 2), the investment impacts of the direct payment and the   21 
area payment are nearly indistinguishable.  These results demonstrate that the 
comparative impact of a direct payment on investment appears to be highly dependent on 
the degree of subsidy capitalization. 
The sensitivity of the results with respect to risk is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  
In Figure 3, the standard deviation of revenue is higher and in Figure 4 there is a stronger 
positive correlation between revenue and land price.  Figure 3 looks quite similar to the 
base case in Figure 1, which implies that the investment results are not very sensitive to 
the standard deviation of revenue variable.  This result stems from the assumption that 
revenues are stationary over time versus a more risky stochastic process such as mean 
reversion.  In Figure 4, the higher level of risk has shifted all of the schedules down by a 
modest amount.  The most interesting aspect of Figure 4 is that the stronger correlation 
between revenue and land price has made the investment impacts of the two types of 
subsidies virtually indistinguishable. 
The last sensitivity result to be explored is with respect to the farmer’s time 
horizon  (Figure 5).  Increasing the farmer’s horizon from 20 to 30 years (T = 15 versus T 
= 10) narrows the difference in the level of cumulative investment for the two alternative 
investment schemes to a very small level.  More research is necessary to provide a 
explanation for this result. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  The dynamic programming model used to generate these results is very simplistic 
in that many important features of farm investment have been assumed away.  Moreover, 
the knife-edge foreclosure rule that underlies this model does not accurately reflect the 
process of farm bankruptcy in the real world.  Nevertheless, given the strength of the   22 
results presented here, it is likely that even in a more realistic investment environment, 
the link between a direct payment and farm investment is likely to be significant.  
Suggesting that a farm manager, who is cautiously investing in agricultural land because 
of concerns about bankruptcy, will invest more aggressively upon receipt of a direct 
payment is also likely to receive considerable anecdotal support.  
  An interesting feature of this model is that providing the farmer with either type 
of subsidy is welfare enhancing.  In the absence of a subsidy, the level of investment is 
below the first best level because of a market failure (i.e., premature bankruptcy).  The 
subsidy raises the investment toward the first best level and it must therefore raise overall 
welfare, unless the transaction cost of distributing the subsidy to the farmer is excessive.  
This aspect of farm subsidies in a second best environment arises in many different 
situations, even though it is seldom acknowledged in multilateral discussions about the 
need to reduce farm subsidies. 
  There are many ways the model can be improved.  It would be interesting to 
determine the extent that the link between a direct payment and farm investment would 
disappear if the irreversible investment assumption is relaxed.  Similarly, if other 
determinants of net farm income (e.g., off-farm income and consumption expense) were 
made endogenous within the model, then the probability of bankruptcy would be reduced 
because the farmer would have an implicit mechanism for stabilizing income.  The model 
is also lacking an appropriate specification of supply response.  The interaction between 
supply response and investment may have important implications for the results 
presented here.  Probably the easiest way to improve the model is to increase the   23 
accuracy of the results in exchange for longer computation time by increasing the number 
of price and debt intervals in the probability transition matrix. 
  Finally, the model could be calibrated more closely to a real world investment 
environment and the various results could be subjected to empirical verification.  For 
example, the model predicts that in the absence of a subsidy, farm investment is lower the 
higher the level of revenue and price variability and the higher the debt to asset ratio.  
These are testable hypotheses that could be examined using secondary data.  If farm 
investment can only be weakly linked to these two variables, then it is unlikely that a 
direct payment will have a significant impact on farm investment.   
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Appendix 
 
  The purpose of this appendix is to explain the procedure for numerically 
evaluating equation (8) in the text.  The procedure is based on Mee and Owen’s (1983) 
approximation formula for the cumulative density function for a standardized bivariate 
normal distribution.  The general problem is to evaluate 
(A.1)  dxdy y x f PR
b a
) ; , ( ρ ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ −
=  
where f(x, y; ρ ) is the standardized bivariate normal density function. There are two cases 
to consider.  First, suppose the absolute value of a equals or exceeds the absolute value of 
b.  In this case, if a ≤  0 then set µ  = -ρφ (a)/Φ(a) and σ  = (1 + ρ aµ  - µ
2)
0.5 where φ(
.) is the 
probability density function for a univariate standard normal random variable and Φ(
.) is 
the associated cumulative density function.  Now, PR ≈  Φ(a)Φ((b - µ )/σ ).  For the case 
where a > 0, then µ  = ρφ (-a)/Φ(-a), σ   takes on the same expression as the previous case 
and PR ≈  Φ(b)-φ(-a)Φ((b - µ )/σ ).  Now suppose the absolute value of a is less than the 
absolute value of b.  In this case, if b ≤  0 then µ  = -ρφ (b)/Φ(b) and σ  = (1 + ρ bµ  - µ
2)
0.5 
and PR ≈  Φ(b)Φ((a - µ )/σ ).  If b > 0 then µ  = ρφ (-b)/Φ(-b), σ  takes on the same 
expression as in the previous case and PR ≈  Φ(a) -φ(-b)Φ((a - µ )/σ ).  
  Equation (A.1) can be used to evaluate the more general expression 
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by recognizing that   27 
(A.3) 
dxdy y x f dxdy y x f
dxdy y x f dxdy y x f dxdy y x f
L L L H




b a b a




) ; , ( ) ; , (
) ; , ( ) ; , ( ) ; , (
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
∞ − ∞ − ∞ − ∞ −




The approximation implied by equations (A.1) and (A.3) is remarkably accurate.  The 
results are generally accurate to no less than two digits to the right of the decimal within 
the PR result.  Accuracy is maximized when ρ  falls in the interval [-0.5, 0.5].     28 
Table 1: Parameters Settings for Base Case and Sensitivity Analysis 
Base Case  P
min = 6, P
max = 16, P = 10, θ  = 0.5, d
min = -15, d
max = 15, h
P = 3, h
d = 
30, R =1.05, σ P = 1, σ R = 0.75, ρ  = 0.5, r = 0.1, T = 10, n0 = 5, 
j
* = 20, (s, w)
1 = {0, 0}, (s, w)
2 = {0.2, 0}, (s, w)
3 = {0, w(j
*) = 2.046} 
Subsidy 
Capitalization 
base case parameters except P
min = 6.5 (7), P
max = 14.5 (15), P = 10.5 
(11) and w(j
*) = 2.0571 (2.039) with 25% (50%) capitalization 
High Revenue 
Variability 
base case parameters except σ R = 1, w(j
*) = 1.9685 
High 
Correlation 
base case parameters except ρ  = 0.75, w(j
*) = 2.039 
Long Time 
Frame 
base case parameters except T = 15, w(j
*) = 2.2827 
Note: w(j
*=20) ensures that expected present value of area payment with s = 0.2 is equal 
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